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Karl Raluier affirmed that, methodologically, practical science should he atheistic. This
cannot he truer in our time, when science is making giant progressive strides every day, solving
serious problems, helping to affirm human autonomy and independencefrom the absolute, and
consciously or unconsciously deleting from tvetttal categories every reference to the miracu-
lous. This situation calls for a reworking ofa possible and enduring reconnection ofpractical
science with theology, so that the methodological atheism ofpractical science does not become
a manner of living, and so that the seeming dutnbness of religion before the ever-advancing
practical science does not transform itself into an intellectual unproductivity. The author pro-
poses a hypostatic modelfor a return to a fruitful relationship between the two disciplines.
Historical background
For the catholic theology, Jesus Christ, the
Word made tlesh, who lived historically some
thousands of years ago in the Middle East is
God. The saying that he lived thousands of
years ago in the Middle East contains in itself
the truth that he lived as a man among his
people. Therefore, he is for the catholic faith
and theology true God and true Man. He is a
specific one person in whom exist two natures,
human and divine, possible through what is
historically referred to as the '"hypostatic
union." This is a union in which the divine
and human natures (physis) are harmoniously
united in the single substance (hypostasis) of
the divine Logos. From the earliest centu-
ries, the Church had engaged in a theological
struggle against many lines of thought and
theological traditions in order to safeguard the
teachings on this dual nature of Christ. In this,
the Church in different councils through the
centuries formulated different dogmatic defi-
nitions, which must be accepted, believed, and
professed. Prominent among these councils
were the Nicene, the Constantinopolitan, the
Ephesian, and the Calchedonian Councils.
The Nicene Council (325 c.e.), with a re-
affirmation of the divinity of Christ, con-
demned Arius and his disciples, who, insist-
ing that only God the Father is ungenerated,
saw Jesus Christ (the generated Son) as a crea-
ture, though of an order higher than the hu-
man. The Council of Constantinople (381
(M.) reaffirmed the integrity of the human
nature of Christ, condemned Apollinare and
his followers, who identified "nature" with
person." In doing so, it became difficult for
them to reconcile the cohabitation of two per-
sons in a single individual and, as a conse-
quence, considered the humanity of Christ as
unreal. Further, in 431 ( .n., the Council of
Ephesus reaffirmed the perfect unity existing
between these two natures in Christ. It con-
demned Nestorius and his students, who, in
insisting on Christotokos (Mother of Christ)
and rejecting Theotokos (Mother of God) as
the true title of the Blessed Virgin Mary, sepa-
rated in a radical manner the divine and the
human natures in Christ. And finally, there
was the Council of Calchedonia of 451 c.e.,
which condemned the christological error of
monophysitism. This enor was authored by
Eutyches, who, teaching the opposite of the
Nestorian error, affirmed that when the divine
Logos assumed the human nature, it absorbed
it completely in such a way that the human
nature was completely annihilated. He held
that before the union, there were two distinct
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natures, but after the union, what remained is
only the divine nature. This error consists, as
the name imphes, in turning the dual nature
of Christ into one.
The hypostatic union
Historically, the dogmatic fomiula popu-
larly known as the "'hypostatic union" is iden-
tified with the Council of Calchedonia. The
creed issuing from that Council says:
...the Lord Jesus Christ, is one and the
same, the same perfect in divinity, the
same perfect in humanity, true God and
true man, consisting of a rational soul
and body, consubstantial with the
Father in divinity and consubstantial
with us in humanity, 'in all things like
as we are, without sin' [Heb4:15], born
of the Father before all time as to his
divinity, born in recent times for us and
for our salvation from the Virgin Mary,
Mother of God, as to his humanity.
We confess one and the same Christ,
the Son, the Lord, the Only-begotten, in
two natures unctinfused, unchangeable,
undivided and inseparable. The
difference of natures will never be
abolished by their being united, but rather
the properties of each remain unimpaired,
both coming together in one person
(prosopon) and substance (hypostasis),
not parted or divided among two persons
(prosopa), but in one and the same Only-
begotten Son, the divine Word, the Lord
Jesus Christ, as previously the prophets
and Jesus Christ himself taught us and
the Creed o\' the Fathers handed down to
us. The above having been ct)nsidered
with all and every care and diligence, this
Holy Ecumenical Council has defined
that no one may advance any other belief
or inscribe, compose, hold or teach it in
any other way.'
Commenting on this dogmatic definition,
Gerald O'Collins wrote:
...the second part of the confession
(302) broke new ground by affirming
Christ's one person {'prosopon' and
'hypostasis') "in" his two natures,
human and divine. It specified that "the
one and the same Christ, Son, Lord, and
Only Begotten" had been made known
in these two natures which without
detriment to their full characteristics,
continue to exist "without blending or
change, and without division or
separation", while belonging to only
one and not two "persons" (prosopa)r
Though the teachings of this council were
primarily directed against Eutyches and the
monophysists, it also condemned every previ-
ous christological error (Arianism,
ApoUinarianism, and Nestorianism), and be-
came this way an indispensable point of refer-
ence for any catholic Christology worthy of
the name. In a nutshell, the hypostatic union
teaches that in the person (hypostasis) of Christ,
the divine Logos, the divine and the human
natures are united in such a way that they are
perfectly united without confusion, and at the
same time perfectly distinct without separation.
Now, the question is: What implications has
this hypostatic union for working out a better
and more harmonious relationship between
science and theology? Let us give it a trial.
The implications of the hypostatic
union for science and religion
My aim in this investigation does not in-
clude the project of the identification of the
humanity and the divinity of Cliiist with sci-
ence and religion respectively. Let it be noted
from the outset that the ontological perfec-
tion of the two natures in Christ is infinitely
superior to whatever human intelligence can
represent of science and religion in their his-
torical dispensations and actualization. What
I propose is to avail myself of the harmony
existing between these two natures in Christ
as contained in the dogma of hypostatic union,
and to set it up as a paradigm for a fruitful
and hamionious relationship that might be
expected to exist between science and reli-
gion. Such a harmonious relationship is pre-
supposed, given the teaching of Pius XI:
Scientia, quae vera reriim cognitio sit,
nuniquain cristiaiiae fidei veritatibiis
repugnant. [Science as a true under-
standing of reality can never contradict
the truths of the Christian faith.)
'
Such presupposition is always present in the
magisterial teachings, because revelation does
not contradict human reason and intellect, but
perfects them. Pius XII saw science, philoso-
phy and revelation as instruments of truth
which "like rays of the sun contemplate the
substance, reveal the outline and portray the
lineaments of the same creation.""* Though
366 The Journal of Faith and Science Exchange, 2000
Pius XII understood these instruments of truth
as rays of the sun, yet, they enjoy a legitimate
and healthy autonomy; autonomy both in
methods and the objects of these fonns of
knowing which does not include the slightest
separation of the same. Thus, Vatican II in-
sisted that "methodical research in all branches
of knowledge, provided it is carried out in a
truly scientific manner and does not override
moral laws, can never conflict with the faith,
because the things of the world and the things
of faith derive from the same God." "^ In agree-
ment and in a manner of thinking singular to
him, Karl Rahner adds that theology and sci-
ence "cannot contradict one another since both
right from the outset are distinct from one
another in their area of investigation and their
methodology."'' The term he employs is "dis-
tinct" not "separate," and the choice of such
term is not wholly casual.
Now, the hypostatic union concluded that
in Christ, the divine and the human natures
are united in the one person (hypostasis) of
the Logos, the Son of God, Jesus Christ. In
him, these two natures are united perfectly
without confusion, and are perfectly distinct
without separation. This is the principle of
union that I intend to introduce into the rela-
tionship between sci-
ence and religion.
These two modes of
life and knowledge
would naturally be
united in and under the
reality of the Creator
God, who is their
source, their principle
of action and toward
whom they directly or
indirectly tend. And
just as the two natures
of Christ are united in »
the person of the Logos, science and religion
should find a point of harmonious union in
the God who created humankind and en-
dowed them with intelligence, thus capaci-
tating them to be the masters of the cosmos;
and at the same time inscribed in their hearts
the undeniable desire for the divine.
What, then, does it mean to say that sci-
ence and religion should try to be distinct
without separation, as is modelled in the hy-
postatic union? It means that science and re-
ligion, by being distinct, are not one and the
same thing. This is true with respect both to
their proper subject matter and to their meth-
odology. While science has as its proper
sphere of examination the physical, palpable,
material world, and utilizes the empirical
method to realize itself, religion has God and
the spiritual realities as its objects of study,
depending on revelation from the same God
—
a revelation, which is, however, rationally
grounded in faith. Rahner puts it this way:
...[S]cience investigates in an a
posteriori experience individual
phenomena which human beings
(ultimately tlirough the experience of
their senses) encounter in their world,
and the relationship of these phenom-
ena to one another. Theology has to do
with the totality of reality as such....''
Scientific investigation with its empirico-math-
ematical method is limitedly precise in most
of its findings and conclusions. In compari-
son, religion depends on the veracity of God,
the ground of the totality of reality, who com-
municates the divine Self to humankind in rev-
It is only science^ miserably subjected to
and enslaved by the limitedness of the
unmediated empirical regulations and the
autodestroying arrogance ofpositivism,
that willfind it difficult to acknowledge
this fundamental situation of the human
person as the event of God's absolute self-
communication, that iSy as a spirit.
elation, and is able to go beyond the limited-
ness of science. In this, though it may be de-
void of mathematical description and the labo-
ratory precision of the scientific investigation,
the profession of faith in the divinely revealed
truth is not false and cannot be accused of ir-
rationality. The first thing, therefore, in con-
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sidering any relationship between science and
religion, is to be aware of this distinctiveness
and to respect it. In line with this thinking,
and before he mapped out a line of possible
relationship between science and religion, Paul
Haffner made it unambiguously explicit that
"scientists and theologians had to be careful
not to leave their own respective spheres of
competence." ** These specific spheres of com-
petence cannot be negated or overlooked be-
cause "while science deals with human inves-
tigation of creation. Christian faith [and with
it other world religious traditions] treats of the
initiative taken by God in revealing that which
is beyond the reach of the human mind."''
But the hypostatic union teaches further
that though the divine and the human natures
are distinct, they are not separated. This non-
separatedness must now be introduced into the
science-religion relationship, because, though
they are different means of knowing and liv-
ing, "this does not mean that the differences
between them amount to a total disparity such
as to admit of no contact between them, and
thereby capable of giving rise to situations of
conflict." '" Science and religion have long
existed and supported each other, and there is
nothing within them that makes impossible
such relationship as that modelled on the hy-
postatic union. But the regrettable situation
today is that the human spirit keeps on seeking
to separate science from religion and other
metaphysical thinking, or worse still, to set
them in opposition. In lamenting the separa-
tion of faith from reason, John Paul II speci-
fied that such separation had had a serious con-
sequences within the boundaries of scientific
investigation. According to him, such a situa-
tion has given rise to such a positivistic men-
tality that disassociates itself from every Chris-
tian cosmological vision, refusing to make any
reference to metaphysics and moral ethics."
Regarding this situation, Haffner writes:
This perhaps has been due to a sense of
power and self-sufficiency deriving
from man's greater knowledge of and
control over ihe created reality.''
Talking about the positivistic arrogance,
Rahner wrote that this mentality can easily
...develop in natural scientists, given
their a posteriori pursuit of science,
and—when this tends to become
absolute—it is that mentality of
positivism, that annoyance with
metaphysics, that exclusive confine-
ment to what can be demonstrated by
direct experiment, which is liable to
produce the arrogance of persons who
can present their conclusions as beyond
dispute, a mentality which does not
have much patience with theology.'''
Now, in Jesus Christ, the human and the di-
vine natures are perfect, yet none affirmed its
sufficiency by neglecting the other or separat-
ing one from the other. Because of this, though
he knows that he is about to bring Lazarus back
to life, such knowledge did not prevent the
Lord of life from crying (Jn. 1 1:35). It is such
a hamiony that is capable of resolving the prob-
lem of the gap actually existing between sci-
ence and religion. In his meeting with scien-
tists and students in Cologne Cathedral on 15
November 1980, John Paul II spoke clearly
about strenthening the connection:
An adequate solution to the pressing
questions about the meaning of human
existence, norms of action, and the
prospects of a more far-reaching hope is
possible only in the renewed connection
between scientific thought and the power
of faith in man in search of truth. The
pursuit of a new humanism on which the
future of the third millennium can be
based will be successful only on the
condition that scientific knowledge again
enters upon a living relationship with the
truth revealed to man as God's gift.'^
Lest we live in the world of illusion, the pos-
sibility of harmonious mutual teaching, lean-
ing and complementation between science and
religion should not blind us to the fact that in
the objective, everyday spelling out of their
internal possibilities in external forum, dis-
agreements and momentary conflicts will
surely ensue. Though humankind naturally
tends to God, human intelligence and the use
of it form an indispensable impulse for hu-
man existence. Sometimes, a person is
tempted to go beyond the here-and-now ethi-
cal boundaries, and in the most cases this is
done in "good faith." Such crossing the line
may seem like a disobedience of conscience.
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especially in this age when the custodians of
religious traditions, truths and deposits seem
to have have little or no weight of authority
against the regent democratic systems. This
situation is bound to ensure, in regard to cer-
tain questions concerning human life and liv-
ing, some kind of conflict, even if only ver-
bal. (Think, for example, of the conflict be-
tween political science and religious ethics
—
common conscience—in the recent legaliza-
tion of euthanasia by the government of Hol-
land.) In all, therefore, it is well always to
remember:
It belongs to the very nature of theology
to accept that such cases of conflict are
possible, even while it hopes, and once
more at the eschatological level, that no
such case of conOict will be regarded as
so radical and so positively insurmount-
able that the only remaining course is
for either theology or the sciences to
surrender and submit."
As I have stated above, God, the source
and the end of science and religion, guaran-
tees that between science and religion there
reigns always a fruitful harmony. Now, God
generally is felt in the material world tliiough
the instrumentality of the material world it-
self, and especially through humankind. This
competence of ensuring a non-conflictual
growth between science and religion, which
belongs to God in this model we are propos-
ing, will also be exercised by the divine
agents. Given the fact that the sense of the
sacred is rapidly ebbing in democratic minds,
it becomes the lot of democracy to work out
ways of arresting the uncontrolled human de-
sire for scientific and technological discover-
ies, when it brings along with it the upturn of
moral principles inscribed in human hearts.
Such a democratic system would also set it-
self against any irrational encroachments of
religion in matters scientific, especially when
such scientific advancement does not contra-
dict humanity in its most fundamental essence.
It is true to say that science, given its ex-
tension and methodology, is limited in its in-
vestigation, as stated above. Philip Quinn
made a wonderful "x-ray" of the height and
the depths of the practical sciences, departing
from the presupposition that scientific laws
are logically contingent. He wrote:
The conservation law for matter-energy
is logically contingent. So if it is true,
the question of why it holds rather than
not doing so arises. If it is a fundamen-
tal law and only a scientific explanation
is allowed, the fact that matter-energy is
conserved is an inexplicable brute fact.
For all wc know, the conservation law
for matter-energy may turn out to be a
derived law and so dcduciblc from
some deeper principle of symmetry or
invariancc. But if this is the case, the
same question can be asked about this
deeper principle because it too will be
logically contingent. If it is fundamen-
tal and only scientific explanation is
allowed, then the fact that it holds is
scientifically inexplicable. Either the
regress of explanation icrniinales in a
most fundamental law or it does not. If
there is a deepest law, it will be
logically contingent, and so the fact that
it holds rather than not doing so will be
a brute fact. If the regress does not
terminate, then for every law in the
infinite hierarchy there is a deeper law
from which it can be deduced. In this
case, however, the whole hierarchy will
be logically contingent and so the
question of why it holds rather than
some other hierarchy will arise. So if
only scientific explanation is allowed,
the fact that this particular infinilc
hierarchy of contingent laws holds will
be a brute inexplicable fact. Therefore,
on the assumption that scientific laws
are logically contingent and are
explained by being deduced from other
laws, there are bound to be inexplicable
brute facts if only scientific explanation
is allowed."'
Though Adolf Griinbaum might dismiss
this truth of the limitedness of science as de-
fective on the ground that it "is avowedly or
tacitly predicted on the spontaneity of Noth-
ing," '^ he must be ready to face the dilemma
that the human person is not only flesh and
blood, but is also, in the most fundamental
meaning of human existence, the one who lis-
tens and awaits the self-communication of the
absolute Mystery. Inso far the human person
as a spirit supematurally tends (is ordered)
toward God, science will only be sinning
gravely against itself if it proceeds in its in-
vestigations without any reference to the hu-
man person as spirit. Materially speaking, it
The Boston Theological Institute 369
is only science, condemned to itself and to its
criteria, miserably subjected to and enslaved
by the limitedness of the unmediated empiri-
cal regulations and the autodestroying arro-
gance of positivism, that will find it difficult
to acknowledge this fundamental situation of
the human person as the event of God's abso-
lute self-communication, that is, as a spirit.
It is really a scientific mentality, absolutizing
its poverty and arrogantly refusing to accept
its tiredness and dumbness before the infinite
sea of the divine, that utters such words as
Griinbaum did with regard to creation e.\
nihilo:
But in all of our ordinary and scientific
reasoning, it would be regarded as
magical thinking to suppose that any
mere thought could bring about the
actual existence of the thought-object,
let alone out of nothing."*
Creation out of nothing surely transcends all
scientific operative boundaries, but not for this
is it irrational in the sense of a "magical think-
ing"; rather, it is a mystery before which sci-
ence, as empirical, will remain silent and will
not utter the final word. When of creation t'.v
nihilo Michael Buckley held that we "really
do not know how God 'pulls it off,'"' '' it con-
stituted for Griinbaum a moment for the dem-
onstration of the unreasonableness of creation
out of nothing. But this is not exactly so. That
we do not know how God pulls it off is refer-
ring itself to that "scandal of unintelligibility,"
that is, to that intelligence which affinns cer-
tain tmth like the Trinity or the Incarnation,
which as yet are, and ever will be, beyond the
grasp of the human intellect. Such a scandal
is not meant to represent the defeat of reason;
rather, it is meant to bring science and human
logic into an immediate contact with their lim-
itedness. If science would be humble enough
to be instructed by faith and revelation, sci-
ence would be fulfilling itself in the same act
in which it accepts its limitations.
It is not, however, only science that must
be asked to respect its boundaries as it unites
itself to faith. Faith and revelation are also
expected to be enriched by the ways and the
findings of science. Theologians should al-
ways have before them the immaterial nature
of the question of faith, and in so doing should
measure their language and claims to match
the mystery of faith. Theology, therefore,
which is reflective, would be advised to avoid
as best as possible every rigid mathematical
claim with regard to the questions of religious
experience. In interpreting the content of rev-
elation, theologians should always occupy
themselves with working out of the truths
which aid the human person on the way to
God; and when this involves making refer-
ence to the laws of the physical reality, they
should always be prudent enough to be in-
structed by the experts in this field, allowing
in all things room for the ineffability of the
mystery and avoiding mathematical precision,
which is unnecessary and does not enter
within the legitimacy of theology's compe-
tence. In this way, theology will be saved the
sort of embarrassment as has been witnessed
in the past; with this kind of attitude, the
Church can avoid the accusation of being too
rigid and quick to condemn. Karl Rahner re-
minds us of the historical problem:
For a long time the church resisted the
heliocentric system of Copernicus. For
a long time il tried to hold onto a fixity
of the kinds of living beings by
appealing to the account of creation in
the Book of Genesis. Fyr a long time it
rejected the biological emergence of
humankind from the animal kingdom
and fought against it. hi Hunuini
Generis and in a schema prepared for
Vatican II it taught that the origin of all
human beings begins from a numeri-
cally single pair. In reprimanding
Teilhard de Chardin and repressing his
endeavours it manifested too little
understanding for an ontology in which
created being is conceived in principle
and in the very beginning as being
which is in the process of becoming
within an entire evolution of the
cosmos, which is still in the process of
becoming. The church has often shown
too little understanding toward those
branches of anthropology in which the
material, biological reality of the human
being as such is validated.... The
church was always quicker to say no
that to say yes.-"
Beyond these physical realities whose in-
ternal laws science is trying to master, the
Church should also avoid taking advantage
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of the here-and-now limitations of science and
technology, offering them as proofs of the ex-
istence of and the ground for God and spiri-
tual realities. Haffner states the risk:
[0]nce this gap in our knowledge is
closed, our belief in God may be
compromised. This error is known as
that of the God of the gaps, and is a
reduction of the doctrine concerning
God. Why should He be placed only at
the point of human ignorance, rather
than in the universe as a whole and also
beyond it in His transcendence.^'
Rahner was of the same view from the point
where he started:
The question and the method of a meta-
physical theology do not occur as a con-
sequence of the natural science having
reached their utmost limits, nor are they
extrapolated from these sciences."
The desire to keep science and theology
together in the human self-realization should.
Theology^ which is reflective^ would be
advised to avoid as best as possible
every rigid mathematical claim with
regard to the questions of religious
experience.
however, not blind us to the danger inherent
in not recognizing the undeniable difference
between them. The case at hand is that of Ri-
chard Swinburne, who, insisting on the meth-
odological continuity between science and
theology, concluded:
The very same criteria which scientists
use to reach their own theories lead us
to move beyond those theories to a
creator God who sustains everything in
existence.-'^
That Swinburne ciui attain to the existence
of God cannot be doubted, but that he does it
with the same very scientific criteria employed
by the positive scientists makes me uncomfort-
able. Unless the affirmation is only a piece of
poetry in which scientific "criteria," "God," and
"theories" acquire meaning more than nonnally
contained in them, one must prudently admit
that Swinburne, in writing these words, had "a
slip of thought." No one can employ the sci-
entific method and claim to enter the sphere of
the divine, because "natural science may and
should be methodologically atheistic." -*
Haffner also insisted that "...scientific lan-
guage cannot approach God the creator, for
He is beyond its sphere of competence." -^
Scientific criteria as practical, then, can lead
to God only when sinning against the intel-
lect; scientific criteria as such are subverted.
Griinbaum might be considered right if he
rejects Swinburne's claim. In fact, following
the traditions of such thinkers as Bertrand
Russell, David Hume, and Santayana, he ac-
cused Swinburne's claim of being "epistemo-
logically frivolous by being altogether ex post
facto.'''' -^ According to him, an ex post facto
explanation is that which "is neither retrodictive
or predictive and whose premises have no cor-
roboration by evidence independent of the
given explanaiulam.''-'' Over and against this
theistic ex post facto expla-
nation presented by
Swinburne, Griinbaum set
such explanation as the
gravitational explication of
the orbit of the moon offered
by Newton, the deductive-
nomological argument ad-
vanced by Maxwell's equa-
tions for explaining optical and other electro-
magnetic phenomena, or the genetic explana-
tion of the hereditary phenotypic resemblance
present in the human family. We may not ac-
cuse Griinbaum of falsity, but he has not got
the final word. Though a strict scientific meth-
odology might find it difficult to go beyond it-
self, it does not mean that human knowledge is
delimited by the boundaries of scientific
method. The human person as a spirit in the
world can always transcend this scientific limi-
tations, and this is done specifically through a
response in faith to the self-communication,
explicitly or implicitly, of the absolute Mys-
tery.
[This] occurs when the knowing subject,
instead of focusing its attention on this or
that particular object of the a posteriori
experience, asks itself, in a total return to
itself, about the conditions of the possi-
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bility of subject and of a knowledge and
a freedom which have a reflexive
knowledge of themselves; when thinking
and freedom think themselves.-**
Acknowledging this transcendental dimen-
sion of humanity, science must not turn it-
self into an absolute autonomy in its search
for the meaning of existence. It is an au-
Today, with enormous autonomy^ laudable
precision^ and advancement even in areas
previously unimaginable^ science is chal-
lenging religiony correcting erroneous
religious beliefSy and determining increas-
ingly the way religion thinks of itselfand
its competence.
tonomous discipline, but its autonomy is not
absolute, "because no discipline can furnish
a complete view of the whole gamut of hu-
man experience. Thus each science needs
to be complemented by other spheres of
knowledge." ^"^
Because of the aforementioned reasons and
limitations, Griinbaum cannot, no matter the
logicalness of his argumentation against
Swinburne, and the harshness of and the ille-
gitimate jump made by Swinburne's conclu-
sions, dismiss the truth of a creator God and
the theological conclusions inherent in it as
totally devoid of truth. Both he and Swinburne
should see in the hypostatic union, that is, in
Christ, a way of solving this specific problem,
thus establishing a better relationship between
science and religion—between the scientific
method and the life in divine revelation, and
between the scientific spirit and the religious
spirit which can harmoniously exist in one
given individual—and participating, in this
way, in the new era which John II was inaugu-
rating in 1980 when he addressed the twelve
Nobel Prize winners:
...the issue today is no longer that of
opposition between science and faith.
A new period has begun: the efforts of
scientists and theologians must now be
directed to developing a constructive
dialogue.^"
Conclusion
Having come thus far, I would like to state
my personal conviction. Bringing science and
religion into a relationship ordered according
to the pattern of the hypostatic union means
that science and religion must learn to know
themselves and be able to complement each
i other in the very same act
in which they respect
their distinctiveness.
Bach practical science
occupies itself with a spe-
cific area of human liv-
ing (medicine for ex-
ample), and tries to spe-
cialize in it, while reli-
gion deals with the origi-
^, nal truth in its wholeness.
J And for this, science
must respect religion even in the poverty of
religion's language to express the truth con-
cerning the ultimate question about human ex-
istence. In the words of Rahner:
...the truth of religion... is a priori to a
scientific picture of the world.... Since
the truth of religion... is already in
possession at that point in the existence
of man where lie the presuppositions of
science, which it itself cannot go
beyond, the world-view presented by
science is not a court of appeal against
religion. Certainly, wc must always
insist on and work for the fact that there
should be no double truths, that is,
truths contradicting one another, that
genuinely sober, careful science,
conscious of its limitations and its
hypothetical character does not
contradict faith, that in the case of an
apparent conflict both sides must seek
in honest self-criticism where the
reason for the apparent contradiction is
to be found, but religion is not thereby
simply at the mercy of science and its
world-view.^'
There is no denying that, at times in the past,
religion applied heavy pressure upon science,
sometimes crippling its legitimate advance-
ment and desire for novelty. The scientists of
the time were practically under the dictate of
the religious authority; they could not assert
themselves, in part because science itself did
not have sufficient proofs to convince itself
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of the validity of its findings. The situation
today is very different, if not the exact op-
posite. Today, with enormous autonomy,
laudable precision, and advancement even
in areas previously unimaginable, science is
challenging religion, correcting erroneous
religious beliefs, and determining increas-
ingly the way religion thinksof itself and its
competence. And most of the time, this is
accomplished before a religious authority
that can no longer abort at will even the crud-
est of the scientific research and findings.
The way out of this situation of confronta-
tion is to cultivate a harmonious co-exist-
ence in respect and mutual fulfillment, hav-
ing as a paradigm the hypostatic union. This
may sound like a piece of poetry, but it is
something existentially possible. An ex-
ample of such an existential possibility is
found in the person of Ian Wilmut, who along
with his team cloned Dolly, the first of its
kind in the history of cell manipulation.
Though he has this technological power
within his hands, and as a scientist might
heavily be tempted by curiosity and the de-
sire for novelty, he is still against human
cloning (at least for now) and calls it "crimi-
nally inesponsible.'" ^- In order for this ex-
ample that he sets to become more common
among scientists, theologians need to be suf-
ficiently instructed in the ways of the sci-
ences; and scientists need to be persons of
faith who acknowledge their limitations as
creatures. The way out is the model of the
hypostatic union: scientist-theologians who
are scientifically theological in method, and
theologian-scientists who are theologically
scientific in method.
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